Abstract. The object of this paper is to revisit the results of P. Bernhard (J. Optim. Theory Appl. 27 (1979), 51-69 ) on two-person zero-sum linear quadratic differential games and generalize them to utility functions without positivity assumptions on the matrices acting on the state variable and to linear dynamics with bounded measurable data matrices. The paper specializes to state feedback via Lebesgue measurable affine closed loop strategies with possible non L 2 -integrable singularities. After sharpening our recent results [3] on the characterization of the open loop lower and upper values of the game, it first deals with L 2 -integrable closed loop strategies and then with the larger family of strategies that may have non L 2 -integrable singularities. A new conceptually meaningful and mathematically precise definition of a closed loop saddle point is introduced to simultaneously handle state feedbacks of the L 2 -type and smooth locally bounded ones except at most in the neighborhood of finitely many instant of time. A necessary and sufficient conditions is that the free end problem be normalizable. A complete classification of closed loop saddle points is given in terms of the convexity/concavity properties of the utility function and connections are given with the open loop lower value, upper value, and value of the game. 1. Introduction. The object of this paper is to revisit the pioneering work of P. Bernhard [2] on two-person zero-sum linear quadratic differential games and generalize it to utility functions without positivity assumptions on the matrices acting on the state variable and to linear dynamics with bounded measurable data matrices. The paper specializes to state feedback via Lebesgue measurable affine closed loop strategies with possible non L 2 -integrable singularities. After sharpening the recent results of [3] on the characterization of the open loop lower and upper values of the game in § 2, it first deals with L 2 -integrable closed loop strategies and then with the larger family of strategies that may have non L 2 -integrable singularities. In § 3 several equivalent necessary and sufficient conditions are given for the existence of a closed loop saddle point with respect to L 2 -integrable affine closed loop strategies: the normality of the problem; the existence of an H 1 (0, T ) solution to the associated matrix Riccati differential equation. It was shown in [3] that the existence of a solution to the coupled state-adjoint state system is a necessary condition for the existence of a finite open loop lower value, upper value, or value of the game and that the difference essentially depends on the convexity of the utility function with respect to the control of the minimizing player and on its concavity with respect to the control of the maximizing player. This condition is also necessary for the existence of a closed loop saddle point. It leads to a complete classification in terms on the convexity/concavity properties of the utility function.
1. Introduction. The object of this paper is to revisit the pioneering work of P. Bernhard [2] on two-person zero-sum linear quadratic differential games and generalize it to utility functions without positivity assumptions on the matrices acting on the state variable and to linear dynamics with bounded measurable data matrices. The paper specializes to state feedback via Lebesgue measurable affine closed loop strategies with possible non L 2 -integrable singularities. After sharpening the recent results of [3] on the characterization of the open loop lower and upper values of the game in § 2, it first deals with L 2 -integrable closed loop strategies and then with the larger family of strategies that may have non L 2 -integrable singularities. In § 3 several equivalent necessary and sufficient conditions are given for the existence of a closed loop saddle point with respect to L 2 -integrable affine closed loop strategies: the normality of the problem; the existence of an H 1 (0, T ) solution to the associated matrix Riccati differential equation. It was shown in [3] that the existence of a solution to the coupled state-adjoint state system is a necessary condition for the existence of a finite open loop lower value, upper value, or value of the game and that the difference essentially depends on the convexity of the utility function with respect to the control of the minimizing player and on its concavity with respect to the control of the maximizing player. This condition is also necessary for the existence of a closed loop saddle point. It leads to a complete classification in terms on the convexity/concavity properties of the utility function.
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loop saddle point in the presence of closed loop strategies with non L 2 -integrable singularities. As was pointed out in [2, p. 68 and Remark 5.1] such strategies may lead to conflicting terms that simultaneously blow up in the utility function. Under the positivity assumptions, one may possibly get around this problem by setting the utility function equal to ±∞, but we don't have them here. So we had to introduce a new conceptually meaningful and mathematically precise definition (cf. Definition 4.5). It says that the original problem can be transformed via feedback in such a way that the new resulting problem has an open loop saddle point at (0, 0). The second related issue was to specify the class of affine closed loop strategies (cf. Definition 4.3) in such a way that we could simultaneously handle in the same framework L 2 -integrable closed loop strategies and smooth locally bounded ones except at most in the neighborhood of finitely many instant of time as in [2] .
It turns out that the classical definition of a closed loop saddle point (cf. Definition 3.2) can be a degenerate one when either the open loop lower or upper value of the game is not finite (cf. Theorems 4.5 and 4.6). For instance, Berkovitz [1] 's equivalence Lemma 3.2 may not apply as shown in Example 4.1. The proper point of view of Definition 4.2 is that the two closed loop strategies cannot be chosen independently. They must be linked through the admissibility condition of Definition 4.3. This subtle difference fundamentally changes the nature of the problem and makes it different from the classical theory of saddle points with respect to two independent sets. We show that the normalizability of the free end problem in the sense of [2, Definition 3.2] is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a closed loop saddle point. This condition is also used to make sense of solutions with singularities to the matrix Riccati differential equation.
In § 4.5, we show that under the convexity-concavity condition, Definitions 3.2 and 4.5 of closed loop saddle points coincide and that closed loop strategies with non L 2 -integrable singularities are useless. They naturally occur when either the open loop lower or upper value of the game is not finite. We complete the classification of closed loop saddle points in § 4.6 along with conditions expressed in terms of the convexity/concavity properties of the utility function. We conclude in § 4.7 with an example of a non normalizable problem with finite open loop lower value that can be achieved by state feedback via a solution of the matrix Riccati differential equation.
2. Definitions, notation, and main results.
2.1. System, utility function, values of the game. Given a finite dimensional Euclidean space R d of dimension d ≥ 1, the norm and inner product will be denoted by |x| and x · y, respectively and irrespective of the dimension d of the space. Given T > 0, the norm and inner product in L 2 (0, T ; R n ) will be denoted f and (f, g). The norm in the Sobolev space H 1 (0, T ; R n ) will be written f H 1 . Consider the following two-player zero-sum game over the finite time interval [0, T ] characterized by the quadratic utility function
where x is the solution of the linear differential system
2)
, is the strategy of the first player and v ∈ L 2 (0, T ; R k ), k ≥ 1, is the strategy of the second player. We assume that F is an n × n-matrix and that A, B 1 , B 2 , and Q are matrix-functions of appropriate order that are measurable and bounded almost everywhere in [0, T ]. Moreover Q(t) and F are symmetrical. It will be convenient to use the following compact notation and drop the a.e. in [0, T ] wherever no confusion arises
3)
The above assumptions on F , A, B 1 , B 2 , and Q will be used throughout this paper. The transpose of a matrix M will be denoted M ⊤ , the inverse of its transpose M −⊤ , and R(t) will denote the matrix
The game is said to achieve its open loop lower value (resp. upper value) if 
The open loop value of the game will be denoted by v(x 0 ).
Definition 2.2. Associate with x 0 ∈ R n the sets
2.2. Properties of the utility function. Recall from [3] that the utility function C x0 (u, v) is infinitely differentiable and that its Hessian of second order derivatives is independent of (u, v). Indeed
10)
1 Given a real function f defined on a Banach space B, the first directional semiderivative at x in the direction v (when it exists) is defined as df (x; v) = lim tց0 (f (x + tv) − f (x))/t. When the map v → df (x; v) : B → R is linear and continuous, it defines the gradient ∇f (x) as an element of the dual B * of B. The second order bidirectional derivative at x in the directions (v, w) (when it exists) is defined as d 2 f (x; v, w) = lim tց0 (df (x + tw; v) − df (x; v))/t. When the map (v, w) → d 2 f (x; v, w) : B × B → R is bilinear and continuous, it defines the Hessian operator Hf (x) as a continuous linear operator from B to B * . where x is the solution of (2.4) andȳ is the solution of
It is customary to introduce the adjoint system
and rewrite expression (2.10) for the gradient in the following form
Hence dC x0 (û,v;ū,v) = 0 for allū andv if and only if the coupled system
has a solution (x,p) in
). As expected, the Hessian is independent of (u, v)
whereȳ is the solution of (2.11) andỹ is the solution of of the game is finite for a given initial state x 0 . In each case, the global assumption of finiteness for all initial state x 0 ∈ R n yields the uniqueness of solution (x, p) of the coupled system (2.14) (cf. [3, Thms 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8]). Theorem 2.1. The following conditions are equivalent.
(
ii) The open loop lower value v − (x 0 ) of the game is finite. (iii) There exists a solution in H 1 (0, T ; R n ) 2 of the coupled system and controls
19)
and the following identities are verified 
Similarly, the additional condition −B ⊤ 1 p ∈ U (x 0 ) that appeared in [3, Thms 2.3 and 2.7] is also redundant. Theorem 2.2. The following conditions are equivalent.
2 of the coupled system (2.18) and controls (û,v) given by (2.19), and the following identities are verified
3. L 2 -integrable closed loop strategies. We generalize classical results to L 2 -integrable affine closed loop feedback strategies for general F and Q(t) under the assumptions of § 2.1 on the matrix functions A, B 1 , B 2 , Q, and F . We also give a classification of the possible cases in terms of the open loop properties of lower value, upper value and value of the game and the convexity/concavity of the utility function.
3.1. Definitions and main results. Definition 3.1. The class of L 2 affine closed loop strategies is defined as follows:
We say that φ or ψ is an L 2 linear closed loop strategy if φ or ψ is linear in x. Remark 3.1. To each φ ∈ Φ (resp. ψ ∈ Ψ ) we can associate an
The matrix functions U and V may have singularities, but they are globally L 2 -integrable. As a result the fundamental matrix associated with the L 2 -matrix function A + B 1 U + B 2 V will be invertible everywhere in [0, T ]. Therefore for all φ ∈ Φ and ψ ∈ Ψ the closed loop system
has a unique solution in H 1 (0, T ; R n ). This means that all pairs (φ, ψ) ∈ Φ × Ψ are admissible, and, a fortiori, all pairs of the form (φ, v) or (u, ψ) are admissible for all
(ii) We say that (φ * , ψ * ) ∈ Φ × Ψ is a global closed loop saddle point of C x0 (φ, ψ) in Φ × Ψ if there exists a pair (φ * , ψ * ) ∈ Φ × Ψ such that for all x 0 ∈ R n and for all φ ∈ Φ and ψ ∈ Ψ the inequalities (3.2) are verified. By definition C x0 (φ * , ψ * ) is finite. Thus the saddle point is not "degenerate" in the sense of [2] . The "global version" is better adapted to closed loop strategies. The interest in a closed loop strategy associated with a single initial state is rather limited.
Given any two pairs (φ 1 , ψ 1 ) and (φ 2 , ψ 2 ) achieving a closed saddle point, the mixed pairs (φ 1 , ψ 2 ) and (φ 2 , ψ 1 ) are admissible and also achieve a saddle point. Hence the value of the closed loop saddle point is unique (cf. [1] ).
. We quote Berkovitz [1] 's equivalence Lemma. Lemma 3.2. Given x 0 ∈ R n , the following statements are equivalent:
Theorem 3.1. The following statements are equivalent.
and L 2 -matrices U * and V * of appropriate orders such that for all
(v) There exists a symmetrical solution P with elements in H 1 (0, T ) to the matrix Riccati differential equation
In particular C x0 (φ * , ψ * ) = P (0)x 0 · x 0 and the closed loop strategies are given by
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii). Letx be the trajectory corresponding to the pair (φ * , ψ * ) and denote by (û,v) = (φ * (x), ψ * (x)) the corresponding control pair. Let U * (t) and V * (t) be the respective matrices and u * (t) and v * (t) be the respective vectors such that ϕ * (t, x) = U * (t)x + u * (t) and ψ * (t, x) = V * (t)x + v * (t). Then
Introduce the notation c x0 (u, v) for the utility function C x0 (φ * + u, ψ * + v):
and denote by x the solution of the corresponding state equation
Then the closed loop saddle point inequalities (3.11) become open loop saddle point inequalities for system (3.12) and the new quadratic utility function c x0 (u, v):
and the pair (0, 0) achieves that saddle point. By [3, Lemma 3.1] c x0 (u, v) is convexconcave and dc x0 (0, 0; u, v) = 0 for all u and v. In particular, the coupled system
After substitution, it can be rewritten aŝ
By assumption this is true for all x 0 ∈ R n . But, when system (3.15) has a solution for all x 0 , its solution is unique (cf, [3, § 2.6, pp. 760-761]). As a result for x 0 = 0, (x,p) = (0, 0) and from identities (3.14) (ii) ⇒ (iii). By assumption for all x 0 ∈ R n , the coupled system (3.15) has a unique solution (x,p). By linearity of the solution of system (3.4) with respect to x 0 , there exist H 1 (0, T ) matrices ( X, Λ) solution of the matrix system 
Since the elements of the matrix function A + B 1 U * + B 2 V * are L 2 functions, the associated fundamental matrix solution Φ(t, s) is invertible, X(t)x 0 =x(t) = Φ(t, 0)x 0 , and, a fortiori,
, they are solution of the matrix differential system (3.6) and necessarily det
Finally P is solution of the Riccati matrix differential equation (3.8) . By uniqueness of the solution (x, p) of (3.4), (
and let P be an H 1 (0, T ) solution of the matrix Riccati differential equation (3.8) . By the classical argument in of Bernhard [2] , we get
Choose the closed loop linear strategies φ
By Lemma 3.2 (ii), the linear pair (φ * , ψ * ) is a global closed loop saddle point. Finally, the pair of closed loop strategies φ
3.2. Classification of closed loop saddle points. One of the necessary conditions for the existence of a closed loop saddle point is the existence of a solution to the coupled system in (x,p) that turns out to also be a necessary condition for the finiteness open loop lower value, upper value, or value of the game and the difference essentially depends on the convexity of the utility function with respect to u and on its concavity with respect to v. This leads to the following natural classification in terms of the convexity and concavity properties of the utility function. 
, and v + (x 0 ), respectively. We need the following lemma. Lemma 3.3.
Proof of Lemma 3.3. We only need to prove (i). Since
Conversely, given the pair (φ, v), let x ∈ H 1 (0, T ; R n ) be the solution of the system
The second inequality follows from the fact that
> −∞ and case (f) cannot occur. Therefore we are left with the first four cases.
(b) From the first part of the proof of Theorem 3.1, system (3.15) has a solution and identities (3.14) are verified:
, the above system can be rewritten as follows
But, by construction of (û,v), C x0 (φ * , ψ * ) = C x0 (û,v). Combining the above inequality with inequality (3.20) in Lemma 3.3, we get
and hence the finiteness of v 4. The curse of singularities. We now extend the definitions and results of the previous section to Lebesgue measurable feedback matrices with singularities that are not necessarily L 2 -integrable in any neighborhood of the singularity. How should the families Φ and Ψ of L 2 affine closed loop strategies be extended while preserving the assumption of normalizability of [2] that makes sense of a non H 1 (0, T )-solution P to the matrix Riccati differential equation? It is clear that the choice of the space of solutions of the matrix Riccati differential equation and the specification of the families Φ and Ψ are closely related.
It has been known that the solution of the scalar Riccati differential equation can exhibit singularities that are not movable branch points at least when the coefficients are smooth functions of t (cf. Ince [4, §12.51, p. 293]). Another interesting property is that "the general solution of the Riccati equation is expressible rationally in terms of any three distinct particular solutions, and also that the anharmonic ratio of any four solutions is constant. It also shows that the general solution is a rational function of the constant of integration (cf. Ince [4, §2.15, p. 23 and §12.51, p. 294])."
This result was extended to the n × n (n ≥ 2) solution of the matrix Riccati differential equation by Sorine and Winternitz [6] but with five particular solutions in the general case and four in the symplectic case that corresponds to our assumptions on the data matrices. They also give some thoughts to the space of solutions: "For smooth coefficients A, B, C, and D in the MRE (6) 2 the solution space consists of meromorphic matrices: the matrix elements may have first-order poles, the positions of which depends on the initial conditions. In other words, the MRE (6) has the Painlevé property [4] : the solutions have no moving critical points, i.e., no branch points or essential singularities, the positions of which depend on the initial conditions (cf. [6, pp. 271-272] )."
4.1. Bernhard [2] 's conditions in the free end case. In the free end case with F ≥ 0 and Q(t) ≥ 0, the necessary and sufficient condition of P. Bernhard [ 
(ii) X(t) is invertible except possibly at isolated points in [0, T ], where (X, Λ) is the unique H 1 (0, T ) matrix solution of
, where P is defined in terms of Λ and the pseudo inverse of X as follows
and X(t) ⊤ X(t) −1 is the inverse of X(t) ⊤ X(t) as a matrix from Im X(t) ⊤ onto itself. Condition (ii) defines the matrix function P (t) a.e. in [0, T ] and gives a meaning to a solution of the Riccati differential equation via the solution (Λ, X) of system (4.1). The positivity of F and Q(t) makes the utility function C x0 (u, v) convex in u and this leads to the positivity of P (t) (cf. Remark 3.2). Our objective is to relax those positivity assumptions as in Theorem 3.1. Without them some of the competitive terms in the utility function may simultaneously blow up making it difficult to set the utility function equal to ±∞ (cf. [2, p. 68 and Remark 5.1]). Moreover, non L 2 -integrable singularities in the closed loop strategies invalidate the equivalence (ii) of Lemma 3.2 when either the open loop lower or upper value of the game is not finite. So the very definition of a closed loop saddle point has to be properly revisited and the family of pairs of admissible strategies is no longer Φ × Ψ but a subspace S of an enlarged product space Φ × Ψ containing Φ × Ψ.
Normalizability and its consequences.
Given the matrices A, B 1 , B 2 , Q, and F verifying the conditions of § 2.1, system (4.1) always has a unique H 1 (0, T ) solution (X, Λ) and the definition of [2] still makes sense. Definition 4.1. The problem (2.1)-(2.2) is normalizable if det X(t) = 0 a.e. in [0, T ], where (X, Λ) is the H 1 (0, T ) solution of the matrix differential system (4.1). However, the normalizability property relies on the fact that the state equation can be solved backward in finite dimension. This would not be the case for infinite dimensional evolution systems. Yet, we have the following equivalent property in finite dimension that would be more natural in infinite dimension. Lemma 4.1. The following properties are equivalent.
(i) The problem (2.1)-(2.2) is normalizable.
(ii) For almost all s ∈ [0, T [ , the matrix differential system
has a unique solution ( X s , Λ s ) with elements in H 1 (s, T ). By convention we set X T (T ) = I and Λ T (T ) = F . For all s ∈ [0, T ]\Z and t ∈ [s, T ]\Z, det X s (t) = 0 and P (s) = Λ(s)X(s) −1 = Λ s (s), where Z denotes the zero measure set of instants t at which det X(t) = 0. Remark 4.1. This equivalence should be compared with (iii) in Theorem 3.1. It says that the decoupling operator P (s) can be defined a.e. as Λ s (s) and that the invariant embedding with respect to almost all initial times can still be done as in [3] .
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii). Denote by Z the set of times where X(t) is not invertible. For s ∈ [0, T ]\Z, it is easy to check that the new pair of matrices (
X s (t), Λ s (t)) = (X(t)X(s) −1 , Λ(t)X(s) −1 ) are H 1 (s, T ) solutions of system (4.3). Hence P (s) = Λ(s)X(s) −1 = Λ s (
s). Moreover, by definition, X s (t) is inversible for all t ∈ [s, T ]\Z. (ii) ⇒ (i). Let Z
′ be the zero measure set of initial times for which system (4.3) of Definition 4.1 has no solution. For all s ∈ [0, T ]\Z ′ , X s (T ) is invertible. Indeed, if there exists h = 0 such that X s (T )h = 0, then the pair (x, p) = ( X s h, Λ s h) would be solution of the system Starting with the normalizability property, we now proceed in a constructive way to identify the appropriate definition of a closed loop saddle point in the presence of non L 2 -integrable singularities in the closed loop strategies. The first observation is that Bernhard [2] 's condition (ii) is both equivalent to det X(t) = 0 a.e. in [0, T ] and to the stronger property that the number of zeros of det X(t) is finite. Lemma 4.2. Let (X, Λ) be the H 1 (0, T ) matrix solution of (4.1). Then det X(t) = 0 almost everywhere in [0, T ] if and only if det X(t) = 0 except on a finite set Z of instants in [0, T ).
Proof. The determinant of X(t) is a continuous function of t. Hence its set of zeros Z is a closed and even compact subset of [0, T ]. In dimension one a closed set is the at most countable union of disjoint closed intervals. By assumption, det X(t) = 0 a.e. in [0, T ] implies that Z is the union of at most a countable number of points. If Z has an infinite number of points, then there exists a sequence {t n } in Z and an accumulation point t 0 ∈ Z, t n = t 0 such that t n → t 0 . But this is impossible since around a point of Z there is always an open interval (a, b) such that t 0 ∈ (a, b) and
The converse is obvious.
The normalizability property gives a precise meaning to the closed loop system and to a solution of the matrix Riccati differential equation. Lemma 4.3. Assume that the problem (2.1)-(2.2) is normalizable and denote by Z the finite set of times at which det X(t) = 0. Then and det X s (t) = 0 in [s, T ]\Z. (iv) P verifies the matrix Riccati differential equation
and, for all s ∈ [0, T ]\Z, P X s is an H 1 (s, T ) solution of the matrix system
Proof. (i) It is easy to verify that the derivative of the matrix function
(ii) The second statement follows from the fact that, by definition of P , X ′ = AX − RΛ = AX − RΛX −1 X = (A − RP )X. (iii) Equation (4.5) for X s follows from identity Λ s (t) = Λ t (t) X s (t) = P (t) X s (t). (iv) Again by definition of P and the identity Λ = P X.
The introduction of the closed loop strategies amounts to a change in the state variable via the transformation X(t). Lemma 4.4. Assume that problem (2.1)-(2.2) is normalizable. Let (X, Λ) be the solution of system (4.1) and P be defined by (4.2).
(i) Associate with y 0 ∈ R n the functionx(t) = X(t)y 0 andp(t) = Λ(t)y 0 . They are H 1 (0, T ) solutions of the coupled system
and P x = Λy. In particular
Proof. (i) By definition ofx andp. As for the identities forû andv, they follow from the definition ofp and P :p = Λy 0 = ΛX −1 Xy 0 = Px. (ii) By assumption on u and v, the right-hand side of (4.9) belongs to L 2 (0, T ; R n ) and its solution y belongs to H 1 (0, T ; R n ). By direct computation of the derivative of x = Xy, it is easy to check that x is solution of system (4.10).
We are now ready to prove the following result that sheds some light on the choice of a definition of the closed loop saddle point in the presence of closed loop strategies with non L 2 -integrable singularities. Theorem 4.1. Assume that problem (2.1)-(2.2) is normalizable. Let (X, Λ) be the solution of system (4.1) and P be defined by (4.2). Consider the linear closed loop strategies
where P is defined by (4.2). Then, for all
, there exists a unique solution in H 1 (0, T ; R n ) to the state equation (4.10) and
In particular, for all x 0 ∈ Im X(0), C x0 (φ * , ψ * ) = Λ(0)y 0 · x 0 for some y 0 ∈ R n such that x 0 = X(0)y 0 , and this value is independent of the choice of y 0 such that x 0 = X(0)y 0 .
Proof. By Lemma 4.4, for all y
there exists a unique solution in H 1 (0, T ; R n ) to the state equation (4.10) rewritten in the form
or, after the change of variable y = X −1 x of (cf. (4.9) of Lemma 4.4)
and the utility function C x0 (φ * + u, ψ * + v) is a function of u and v. Recall that P x = ΛX −1 Xy = Λy and hence P x is an H 1 (0, T ; R n ) function. Differentiate the inner product Λy · x as follows
and C X(0)y0 (φ * , ψ * ) = Λ(0)y 0 · X(0)y 0 = Λ(0)y 0 · x 0 . As for the uniqueness of the value of the saddle point, assume that there exists y 
4.3.
Closed loop strategies and saddle points in presence of non L 2 -integrable singularities. In order to accommodate strategies with non L 2 -integrable singularities, we first enlarge the sets of strategies Φ and Ψ. Definition 4.2. The class of affine closed loop strategies is defined as follows:
is Lebesgue measurable, and
We say that φ (resp. ψ) is a linear closed loop strategy if φ (resp. ψ) is linear in x.
To any (φ, ψ) ∈ Φ × Ψ are associated measurable matrices U (t) and V (t) and L 2 vector functions u and v such that φ(t, x) = U (t)x + u(t) and ψ(t, x) = V (t)x + v(t).
At that level of generality, an admissibility condition on the pair (φ, ψ) ∈ Φ × Ψ is required to make sense of a solution of the underlying differential equation. Definition 4.3. We say that the pair (φ, ψ) ∈ Φ × Ψ belongs to S or simply that (φ, ψ) is an admissible pair if the associated matrix differential equation
As in Lemma 4.2, it can be proved that the condition det X(t) = 0 a.e. in [0, T ] is equivalent to det X(t) = 0 except at a finite number of points in [0, T ]. Therefore, the matrix A + B 1 U + B 2 V = X ′ X −1 is the product of an L 2 -matrix function and a continuous matrix function with possible non L 2 -integrable singularities at a finite number of times. Since A, B 1 , and B 2 are L ∞ -matrix functions, it implies that the feedback matrix functions U and V will have properties similar to X ′ X −1 and hence possible non L 2 -integrable singularities at a finite number of times. As a consequence, given an admissible pair (φ, ψ) ∈ S and y 0 ∈ R n , the equation
As for normalizability, Definition 4.3 is equivalent to the following definition. Definition 4.4. We say that the pair (φ, ψ) ∈ Φ × Ψ belongs to S or simply that (φ, ψ) is an admissible pair if, for almost all s ∈ [0, T [ , the matrix differential equation
In view of inequalities (4.13), we now introduce the following definition that says that the original problem can be changed via feedback in such a way that the new resulting problem has an open loop saddle point at (0, 0). It will still be referred to as a closed loop saddle point. Its connection with Definition 3.2 is not completely obvious, but it will be clarified later on. Definition 4.5.
(i) Given x 0 ∈ R n , (φ * , ψ * ) ∈ S is a closed loop saddle point of C x0 if there exists a unique solution in H 1 (0, T ; R n ) to the state equation
(ii) We say that (φ * , ψ * ) ∈ S is an X(0)-global closed loop saddle point of C x0 if for all x 0 ∈ Im X(0) inequalities (4.17) are verified. Remark 4.3. We shall see in the proof of Theorem 4.2 that the existence of a solution to the state equation (4.16) implies that x 0 ∈ Im X(0).
They define an open loop saddle point in U × V after a change of the state variable via the transformation X(t).
The fact that the closed loop strategies φ and ψ of Definition 4.2 with possible non L 2 -integrable singularities need to be linked through the admissibility condition S of Definition 4.3 fundamentally changes the nature of the problem. This subtle difference prevents the use of the nice classical results of the theory of saddle points with respect to two fixed independent sets Φ and Ψ. For instance, two pairs (φ 1 , ψ 1 ) ∈ S and (φ 2 , ψ 2 ) ∈ S cannot be mixed: (φ 1 , ψ 2 ) and (φ 2 , ψ 1 ) need not belong to S as shown in Example 4.1 for the pairs (φ * , ψ * ) ∈ S and (0, 0) ∈ S. In particular, property (ii) of Berkovitz's equivalence Lemma 3.2 is not verified for u = 0 or v = 0. Example 4.1. Consider the example from [2, Example 5.1, p. 67]:
Here A = 0, B 1 (t) = 2 − t, B 2 (t) = t, F = 1/2, Q = 0, and R = B 1 B * 1 − B 2 B * 2 = 4(1 − t). The Riccati equation reduces to
Its solution is positive and blows up at t = 1. The open loop lower value of the game is v − (x 0 ) = (x 0 ) 2 /2 and the open loop upper value of the game is v + (x 0 ) = +∞ for all x 0 ∈ R. The closed loop strategies have a singularity in t = 1:
(4.20)
Yet the state x is an H 1 (0, 2) function and the controlsû andv are L 2 -functions:
Moreover, X(t) = (t − 1) 2 and by Theorem 4.1 we have a closed loop saddle point in the sense of Definition 4.5.
In general for the pair (φ * , v), both the resulting L 2 -norms of the state x and the control u = φ * (x) will blow up even when v = 0: (ii) There exists a pair of closed loop strategies (φ * , ψ * ) ∈ S that achieves an X(0)-global closed loop saddle point of C x0 . For all x 0 ∈ Im X(0) the feedback strategies associated with C x0 are given by
where P is defined by (4.2), and the value of the closed loop saddle point by
for some y 0 ∈ R n such that x 0 = X(0)y 0 and this value is independent of the choice of y 0 such that x 0 = X(0)y 0 .
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii) By Theorem 4.1. In addition, the value of C x0 (φ * , ψ * ) only depends on x 0 ∈ Im X(0) and not on the choice of y 0 such that x 0 = X(0)y 0 .
(ii) ⇒ (i) Denote by U * and V * and u * and v * the matrices and vectors associated with the pair (φ * , ψ * ) ∈ S. By Definition 4.3, there exists a solution X to the matrix differential equation (4.14) 
Let 0 ≤ t 1 < t 2 < · · · < t N < T be the finite set Z of points where det X (t) = 0. On (t N , T ], the functionŷ = X −1x is the solution in H 1 (t N , T ) of
Therefore lim tցtN (X −1x
)(t) =ŷ(t N ). By proceeding successively in a finite number of steps 3 on each interval (t i−1 , t i ) we finally get that X −1x =ŷ and that lim tց0 (X −1x )(t) = y 0 . This implies that x 0 = X (0)y 0 and that x 0 ∈ Im X (0). Since, by assumption, we have a closed loop saddle point for all x 0 in Im
and the solution x of the state equation corresponding to (φ * + u, ψ * + v)
Moreover, by analogy with Lemma 4.4 (ii), y = X −1 x is the solution in H 1 (0, T ; R n ) of the differential equation
We now proceed as in the proof of Theorem 3.1 by introducing the new quadratic utility function c x0 (u, v) = C x0 (φ * + u, ψ * + v), but expressed in terms of the state variable y rather than x. From the closed loop saddle point inequalities 
By introducing the solution π ∈ H 1 (0, T ; R n ) of the adjoint equation
Since X (t) is invertible a.e. in [0, T ], the controls are given by
and this yields the following system of equations
Denote byp the function X −⊤ π. On the interval (t N , T ], it is readily checked thatp is a solution in H 1 (t N , T ; R n ) of the equation
and hence lim tցtN (X −⊤ π)(t) =p(t N ). By proceeding successively in a finite number of steps on each interval (t i−1 , t i ) we get that
Furthermore, the linear coupled system in the state variables (ŷ, π) is similar to the one at the end of the first part of the proof of Theorem 3.1. Since there is a solution for all initial conditions y 0 ∈ R n , its solution is unique. In particular for y 0 = 0, (ŷ, π) = (0, 0) and from identities (4.29)
Thence the functions u * and v * are null. Thereforex(t) = X (t)y 0 ,x(T ) = y 0 , and
Sincex(t) = X (t)y 0 , by linearity of (x,p) with respect to y 0 , we can associate withp an H 1 (0, T ) matrix function Λ solution of the system
where we already know that det X (t) = 0 a.e. in [0, T ]. By uniqueness (X , Λ) = (X, Λ) and the problem is normalizable. 
By inequalities (3.21) and (3.22) in Lemma 3.3,
Hence, there exists (û,v) ∈ Φ × Ψ such that for all φ ∈ Φ and all ψ ∈ Ψ
By Lemma 3.2, (û,v) is a closed loop saddle point in Φ × Ψ.
(ii) ⇒ (i) By assumption, C x0 is convex-concave and (φ * , ψ * ) ∈ Φ × Ψ ⊂ S. By definition of a closed loop saddle point in Φ × Ψ, for all φ ∈ Φ and all ψ ∈ Ψ
the associated matrices U * and V * are L 2 -matrices, and u * and v * are L 2 -vectors. Therefore the state equation (4.16) has a unique solution in
We also have a global version of the previous theorem. Theorem 4.4. The following statements are equivalent.
(i) C x0 has an X(0)-global closed loop saddle point (φ * , ψ * ) ∈ S, X(0) = R n , and C x0 (u, v) is convex in u and concave in v.
(ii) C x0 has a global closed loop saddle point (φ * , ψ * ) ∈ Φ × Ψ and C x0 (u, v) is convex in u and concave in v. Since the cases (c) and (f) are dual of cases (b) and (e), we have the dual result. Theorem 4.6. Assume that C x0 has a closed loop saddle point (φ * , ψ * ) ∈ S and that C x0 (u, v) is concave in v and not convex in u. Denote by (û,v) = (φ * , ψ * ) the associated controls. Then one of the following two possibilities can occur. 
